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Abstract
Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of productivity differ-
ences within industries, and its role in resource allocation. In a benchmark
monopolistically competitive economy, productivity differences introduce two
new margins for allocational inefficiency. When markups vary across firms, lais-
sez faire markets do not select the right distribution of firms and the market-
determined quantities are inefficient. We show that these considerations de-
termine when increased competition from market expansion takes the economy
closer to the socially efficient allocation of resources. As market size grow large,
differences in market power across firms converge and the market allocation
approaches the efficient allocation of an economy with constant markups.
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1. Introduction
Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of heterogeneity in
firm productivity, and the constant reallocation of resources across different
firms.1 The focus on productivity differences has provided new insights into
market outcomes such as industrial productivity, firm pricing and welfare gains
from policy changes.2 When firms differ in productivity, the distribution of
resources across firms also affects the allocational efficiency of markets.
Symmetric firm models explain when resource allocation is efficient by ex-
amining the trade-off between quantity and product variety in imperfectly com-
petitive markets.3 When firms differ in productivity, we must also ask which
types of firms should produce and which should be shut down. Firm differences
in productivity introduce two new margins of potential inefficiency: selection
of the right distribution of firms and allocation of the right quantities across
firms. Dhingra and Morrow [11] show that differences in market power across
firms lead to new trade-offs between variety, quantity and productivity. These
considerations impact optimal policy rules in a fundamental way, distinct from
markets with symmetric costs.
Dhingra and Morrow [11] examine resource allocation in the standard setting
of a monopolistically competitive industry with heterogeneous firm productiv-
ity and free entry (e.g. Melitz 24)4. They generalize the demand structure to
the symmetric directly additive (SDA)5 form of Dixit and Stiglitz [12] which
generates a variable elasticity of substitution, and provides a rich setting for a
wide range of market outcomes (Vives 40, Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenti, and
Thisse 41). For example, Ushchev [38] shows the impact of market expansion
on product ranges of firms can be modelled flexibly with SDA preferences, while
Dhingra and Morrow [11] and Bertoletti et al. [8] show that increasing markups
could result from market expansion when the elasticity of marginal utility falls
with quantity. When elasticities vary with quantity, firms differ in market power
and market allocations reflect the distortions of imperfect competition. Under
SDA, the market maximizes real revenues, which implies that the private bene-
fits to firms are perfectly aligned with social benefits only under CES demand.
More generally, the market allocation is inefficient because of lack of full appro-
priability of consumer surplus and the business stealing externality that firms
impose on each other.
Trade creates larger, more competitive markets, which could reduce the dis-
tortions associated with imperfect competition and provide welfare gains (Krug-
man 21). In the presence of productivity differences across firms, misallocation
1For instance, Görg et al. [15] show that firm-size distribution affects the relationship
between an industry’s employment and output.
2Example, Pavcnik [31], Asplund and Nocke [3], Foster et al. [14], Melitz and Redding [26].
3Example, Spence [36], Venables [39], Mankiw and Whinston [23], Stiglitz [37].
4The first instance of analysis of a CES model of monopolistic competition with heteroge-
neous firms was in Montagna [28] in a static, partial equilibrium setting
5Labelled as such given the direct utility is additive and the sub utility is the same for all
goods.
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varies with firm productivity, which may be difficult to elicit, especially if how
policy treats a firm varies with it’s observed type. One potential policy option
that does not require firm-level information is international integration. The
idea of introducing foreign competition to improve efficiency goes back at least
to Melvin and Warne [27]. Helpman and Krugman [17] provide sufficient condi-
tions for welfare gains from trade in symmetric firm trade models. They show
when productivity and variety do not decline after integration, then there are
gains from trade.6 Dhingra and Morrow [11] show that market integration al-
ways provides welfare gains when private and social incentives are aligned, which
is characterized by the demand elasticity and the elasticity of utility in their set-
ting. This is true for any cost distribution, but requires a regularity condition
on preferences when private markups are decreasing. An increase in market size
increases competition and reduces per capita demand for each variety. When
preferences are aligned, market expansion alters the private and socially relevant
demand elasticities for quantity choice in the same direction. The market there-
fore incentivizes firms towards the right allocation and provides higher welfare.
Building on this result, Bykadorov et al. [9] show that aligned preferences are
necessary and sufficient for welfare gains from trade under symmetric firms and
variable marginal costs.
While integration can increase welfare, a more ambitious question is: can we
ever expect trade to eliminate the distortions of imperfect competition? Follow-
ing Stiglitz [37], this paper examines market and optimal outcomes as market
size becomes arbitrarily large. Small markets may have insufficient competition,
so looking at large markets allows us to understand where market expansion is
headed and when international trade or growth enables markets to eventually
mitigate distortions.
As a benchmark for understanding efficiency gains, we follow the literature
on imperfect competition in large markets and examine whether integration
with large global markets leads to allocational efficiency (Vives 40, Chapter
6). Integration with large markets will push outcomes towards a new concept,
the “CES limit”, where firms converge to charging constant markups. Unlike a
perfectly competitive limit (Hart 16), productivity dispersion and market power
persist in the CES limit. Yet the market is efficient and integration with large
global markets is therefore a first-best policy to eliminate the distortions of
imperfect competition. However, as the limit may require a market size which
is unattainable even in fully integrated world markets, integration may be an
incomplete tool to reduce distortions.
Our results for large markets are related to an earlier literature that ex-
amines the pricing strategies of symmetric oligopolistic firms as the number of
entrants gets large. Previous work shows oligopolistic firms continue to have
6Specifically, let w denote the wage and C(w, q) = w(c+ f/q) denote the average unit cost
function for producing q units of variety c. When firms are symmetric in c, trade is beneficial
as long as variety does not fall (Me ≥ Maute ) and average unit cost of the autarky bundle is
lower (C(w, q) · qaut ≤ C(w, qaut) · qaut).
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market power as the number of entrants gets large when the residual demand
elasticity is bounded (Perloff and Salop 32, Vives 40 Chapter 6). We instead
examine the limit as market size gets large (because entry is not a primitive
in the monopolistically competitive model), and find that market power and
productivity differences persist in large markets. Such persistence of imper-
fect competition is consistent with the observation of Samuelson [34] that “the
limit may be at an irreducible positive degree of imperfection” (Khan and Sun
18). It is remarkable that the large market outcome, which exhibits productiv-
ity differences and remains imperfectly competitive, is socially optimal. This
shows markups and productivity differences are consistent with large markets
and efficiency.
While SDA preferences generate a variable elasticity of substitution, they
differ from other symmetric preferences that feature variable elasticities of sub-
stitution (VES). For instance, the literature on monopolistic competition gener-
ates variable elasticities through a number of different preference forms, such as
quasilinear and quadratic (Melitz and Ottaviano 25, Nocco et al. 29), indirectly
additive (Bertoletti and Etro 6) and homothetic (Benassy 5, Feenstra 13). The
optimality results generated in other VES, but non-SDA preferences, heteroge-
neous firm models differ. For example, Bertoletti et al. [7] demonstrate for the
full class of indirectly additive preferences (which includes CES preferences),
market expansion is neutral on prices, production and the equilibrium cutoff for
active firms, thus replicating the CES results always, and not just at the limit.
However except under CES preferences, the equilibrium is inefficient in terms
of pricing, production and selection. Similarly, Nocco et al. [30] find market
allocations are inefficient in their setting: the market cutoff productivity is too
low and low cost firms under-produce while high cost firm over-produce in the
market.7 Furthermore, firm heterogeneity makes entry distortions dependent on
the cost distribution. Finally, Arkolakis et al. [1] consider a demand system en-
compassing additively separable preferences with a bounded choke price. While
they don’t consider optimality, they discuss the gains from trade liberalization
as in Arkolakis et al. [2]. SDA preferences differ from these preferences, as they
do not have a bounded choke price, and large markets cause heterogeniety across
firms to collapse in this case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recaps the standard monopolistic
competition framework with firm heterogeneity. Section 3 examines welfare
gains from integration, deriving a limit result for large markets. Section 4
concludes.
2. Model
We adopt the SDA demand structure of Dixit and Stiglitz within the het-
erogeneous firm framework of Melitz. Monopolistic competition models with
7Nocco et al. [29] show that the mass of firms cannot be unambiguously ranked even when
the model is parameterized with a linear demand and Pareto cost distribution.
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2.1 Consumers 5
heterogeneous firms differ from earlier models with product differentiation in
two significant ways. First, costs of production are unknown to firms before
sunk costs of entry are incurred. Second, firms are asymmetric in their costs of
production, leading to firm selection based on productivity. This Section lays
out the model and recaps the implications of asymmetric costs for consumers,
firms and equilibrium outcomes.
2.1. Consumers
We explain the SDA demand structure and then discuss consumer demand.
The exposition for consumer demand closely follows Zhelobodko et al. [41] which
works with a similar setting and builds on work by Vives [40].
An economy consists of a mass L of identical workers, each endowed with
one unit of labor and facing a wage rate w normalized to one Workers have
identical preferences for a differentiated good. The differentiated good is made
available as a continuum N of horizontally differentiated varieties indexed by
i ∈ [0, N ]. Given prices pi for the varieties, every worker chooses quantity qi for
each of the varieties to maximize her utility subject to her budget constraint.
Preferences over differentiated goods take the general SDA form:
U(q) ≡
ˆ N
0
u(qi)di (1)
where u(·) is thrice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave on (0,∞), and u(0) is normalized to zero. The concavity of u ensures
consumers love variety and prefer to spread their consumption over all available
varieties. Here u(qi) denotes utility from an individual variety i. Under CES
preferences, u(qi) = q
ρ
i as specified in Dixit-Stiglitz and Krugman [20].
8
For each variety i, SDA preferences induce an inverse demand p(qi) =
u′(qi)/δ where δ is the consumer’s budget multiplier. As u is strictly increasing
and concave, for any fixed price vector the consumer’s maximization problem
is concave. The necessary condition which determines the inverse demand is
sufficient, and has a solution provided inada conditions on u.9 Multiplying both
sides of the inverse demand by qi and aggregating over all i, the budget multiplier
is δ =
´ N
0
u′(qi) · qidi. The consumer budget multiplier δ will act as a demand
shifter and the inverse demand will inherit the properties of the marginal util-
ity u′(qi). In particular, the inverse demand elasticity |d ln pi/d ln qi| equals the
elasticity of marginal utility µ(qi) ≡ |qiu′′(qi)/u′(qi)|, which enables us to char-
acterize market allocations in terms of demand primitives. Under CES pref-
erences, the elasticity of marginal utility is constant and the inverse demand
elasticity does not respond to consumption (|d ln pi/d ln qi| = µ(qi) = 1 − ρ).
8The specific CES form in Melitz is U(q) ≡
(´
(qρi di
)1/ρ
but the normalization of the
exponent 1/ρ in Equation (1) will not play a role in allocation decisions.
9Additional assumptions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium
are in a separate note available online. Utility functions not satisfying inada conditions are
permissible but may require parametric restrictions to ensure existence.
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2.2 Firms 6
When µ′(qi) > 0, the inverse demand of a variety becomes more elastic as its
consumption increases. The opposite holds for µ′(qi) < 0, where the demand
for a variety becomes less elastic as its price rises. Zhelobodko et al. [41] show
that the elasticity of marginal utility µ(qi) can also be interpreted in terms of
substitution across varieties. For symmetric consumption levels (qi = q), this
elasticity equals the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between any two
varieties. For µ′(q) > 0, higher consumption per variety or fewer varieties for a
given total quantity, induces a lower elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Consumers perceive varieties as being less differentiated when they consume
more, but this relationship does not carry over to heterogeneous consumption
levels.
The inverse demand elasticity summarizes market demand, and will enable
a characterization of market outcomes. A policymaker maximizes utility, and is
not concerned with market prices. Therefore, we define the elasticity of utility
ε(qi) ≡ u′(qi)qi/u(qi), which will enable a characterization of optimal alloca-
tions. For symmetric consumption levels, Vives [40] points out that 1− ε(qi) is
the degree of preference for variety as it measures the utility gain from adding a
variety, holding quantity per firm fixed. To get an analogue of the discrete good
case, consider a consumer who ceases to purchase variety 0, or more formally,
a basket of varieties [0, α]. The consumer loses average utility of
´ α
0
u (qi) di/α
per variety and saves an average income of
´ α
0
piqidi/α per variety. The sav-
ings can be used to increase consumption of all other varieties proportionally
by
´ α
0
piqidi/
´ N
α
piqidi, leading to a rise in average utility per variety of
ˆ N
α
u′ (qi)
[ˆ α
0
piqidi/α
ˆ N
α
piqidi
]
qidi = δ
ˆ α
0
piqidi/α.
Letting α approach zero gives us an expression for how 1 − ε measures the
net welfare gain of purchasing additional variety: a welfare gain of u (qi) at a
welfare cost of δpiqi by proportionally consuming less of other varieties. As pi =
u′(qi)/δ, 1− ε(qi) = (u(qi)− u′(qi)qi) /u(qi) denotes the welfare contribution of
variety relative to quantity. With these demand-side elasticities in hand, we
turn to firms’ production and entry decisions.
2.2. Firms
There is a continuum of firms which may enter the market for differentiated
goods, by paying a sunk entry cost of fe > 0. The mass of entering firms is
denoted by Me. Firms are monopolistically competitive and each firm produces
a single unique variety. A firm faces an inverse demand of p(qi) = u′(qi)/δ
for variety i. It acts as a monopolist of its unique variety but takes aggregate
demand conditions δ as given. Upon entry, each firm receives a unit cost c ≥ 0
drawn from a distribution G with continuously differentiable pdf g. Each variety
can therefore be indexed by the unit cost c of its producer.
After entry, should a firm produce, it incurs a fixed cost of production f > 0.
Profit maximization implies firms produce if they can earn non-negative profits
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2.3 Market Equilibrium 7
net of the fixed costs of production. A firm with cost draw c chooses its quantity
q(c) to maxq(c)[p(q(c))−c]q(c)L and q(c) > 0 if pi(c) = maxq(c)[p(q(c))−c]q(c)L−
f > 0. To ensure the firm’s quantity FOC is optimal, we assume marginal
revenue is strictly decreasing in quantity and the elasticity of marginal utility
µ(q) = |qu′′(q)/u′(q)| is less than one. A firm chooses its quantity to equate
marginal revenue and marginal cost (p+ q · u′′(q)/δ = c), and concavity of the
firm problem ensures low cost firms supply higher quantities and charge lower
prices.
The markup charged by a firm with cost draw c is (p(c)− c) /p(c) = −q(c)u′′(q(c))/u′(q(c)).
This shows that the elasticity of marginal utility µ(q) summarizes the markup:
µ(q(c)) = |q(c)u′′(q(c))/u′(q(c))| = (p(c)− c) /p(c)
When µ′(q) > 0, low cost firms supply higher quantities at higher markups.
2.3. Market Equilibrium
Profits fall with unit cost c, and the cutoff cost level of firms that are indif-
ferent between producing and exiting from the market is denoted by cd. The
cutoff cost cd is fixed by the zero profit condition, pi(cd) = 0. Firms with cost
draws higher than the cutoff level earn negative profits and do not produce. The
mass of producing firms in equilibrium is therefore M = MeG(cd).
In summary, each firm faces a two stage problem: in the second stage it
maximizes profits given a known cost draw, and in the first stage it decides
whether to enter given the expected profits in the second stage. To study the
Chamberlinian tradeoff between quantity and variety, we maintain the standard
free entry condition imposed in monopolistic competition models. Specifically,
ex ante average profit net of sunk entry costs must be zero,
´ cd
0
pi(c)dG = fe.
This free entry condition along with the consumer’s budget constraint ensures
that the resources used by firms equal the total resources in the economy, L =
Me
[´ cd
0
(cq(c)L+ f)dG+ fe
]
.
2.4. Social Optimum
To assess the efficiency of resource allocation in the market equilibrium, we
now describe the policymaker’s optimal allocation. A policymaker maximizes
individual welfare U as given in Equation (1) by choosing the mass of entrants,
quantities and types of firms that produce.10 The policymaker can choose any
allocation of resources that does not exceed the total resources in the economy.
However, she faces the same entry process as for the market: a sunk entry cost fe
must be paid to get a unit cost draw from G(c). Fixed costs of production imply
that the policymaker chooses zero quantities for varieties above a cost threshold.
Therefore, all optimal allocation decisions can be summarized by quantity q(c),
potential variety Me and a productivity cutoff cd. The policymaker chooses
q(c), cd and Me to
10Free entry implies zero expected profits, so the focus is on consumer welfare.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
8
max Me
ˆ cd
0
u(q(c))dG where L ≥Me
{ˆ cd
0
[cq(c)L+ f ]dG+ fe
}
.
Our approach for arriving at the optimal allocation is to think of optimal
quantities qopt(c) as being determined implicitly by cd andMe so that per capita
welfare can be written as
U = Me
ˆ cd
0
u(qopt(c))dG (2)
Optimal quantities ensure marginal utility equals the social marginal cost of
a variety, u′(qopt(c)) = λc where λ is the resource multiplier for fixed cd andMe.
This is equivalent to the observation that efficiency requires the Marginal Rate
of Substitution to equal the Marginal Rate of Transformation across varieties,
along with an optimal resource multiplier that embodies the endpoint conditions
cd and Me which depend in turn on the cost distribution G. After solving for
each qopt conditional on cd and Me, Equation (2) can be maximized in cd and
Me. Of course, substantial work is involved in showing sufficiency, but we
relegate this to the Appendix. The next two Sections compare the market and
optimal allocations in this framework.
3. Market Efficiency
Having described an economy consisting of heterogeneous, imperfectly com-
petitive firms, we now examine welfare and efficiency from integration with
world markets. The existence of gains from international trade is one of the
“most fundamental results” in economics (Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare [10]).
Increases in market size encourage competition, so we might expect that inte-
gration would reduce market power and improve welfare. However, in a second-
best world, there is no guarantee that expanding the economy’s opportunities,
through trade or anything else, necessarily leads to a gain (see Helpman and
Krugman [17], pp. 179). Building on this insight, we examine efficiency in
large markets to understand the potential of market expansion in eliminating
distortions. We show large integrated markets can eliminate distortions, while
preserving firm heterogeneity.
3.1. Integration, Market Size and Efficiency
We begin with the equivalence between market expansion and trade. Propo-
sition 1 shows an economy can increase its market size by opening to trade with
foreign markets. The market equilibrium between freely trading countries of
sizes L1, ..., Ln is identical to the market equilibrium of a single autarkic coun-
try of size L = L1 + ...+ Ln, echoing Krugman [19]. This result is summarized
as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Free trade between countries of sizes L1, ..., Ln has the same
market outcome as a unified market of size L = L1 + ...+ Ln.
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3.1 Integration, Market Size and Efficiency 9
Proof. Consider a home country of size L opening to trade with a foreign country
of size L∗. Suppose the consumer’s budget multipliers are equal in each country
so δ = δ∗ and that the terms of trade are unity. We will show that the implied
allocation can be supported by a set of prices and therefore constitutes a market
equilibrium. The implied quantity allocation, productivity level and per capita
entry are the same across home and foreign consumers, so opening to trade is
equivalent to an increase in market size from L to L+ L∗.
Let e denote the home terms of trade, so
e ≡M∗e
ˆ c∗d
0
p∗xq
∗
xLdG/Me
ˆ cd
0
pxqxL
∗dG
and by assumption e = e∗ = 1. Then the MR = MC condition implies a
home firm chooses p(c)[1 − µ(q(c))] = c in the home market and e · px(c)[1 −
µ(qx(c))] = c in the foreign market. A foreign firm chooses e∗ · p∗(c)[1 −
µ(q∗(c))] = c in the foreign market and p∗x(c)[1 − µ(q∗x(c))] = c in the home
market. When δ = δ∗ and e = e∗ = 1, quantity allocations and prices are
identical, i.e. q(c) = q∗x(c) = q∗(c) = qx(c) and p(c) = p∗x(c) = p∗(c) = px(c).
This implies cost cutoffs are also the same across countries. The cost cutoff
condition for home firms is pi+epix = (p(cd)− cd) q(cd)L+e (px(cd)− cd) qx(cd)L∗ =
f . Substituting for optimal q∗ and q∗x in the analogous foreign cost cutoff condi-
tion implies cd = c∗d. From the resource constraint, this fixes the relationship be-
tween entry across countries as L/Me =
´ cd
0
[cq(c)+cqx(c)+f ]dG+fe = L
∗/M∗e .
Thus, δ = δ∗ and e = e∗ = 1 completely determines the behavior of firms. What
remains is to check that δ = δ∗ and e = e∗ = 1 is consistent with the consumer’s
problem and the balance of trade at these prices and quantities consistent with
firm behavior.
For the consumer’s problem, we require at home that 1 = Me
´ cd
0
pqdG +
M∗e
´ c∗d
0
p∗xq
∗
xdG, which from L/Me = L∗/M∗e is equivalent to
L/Me = L
ˆ cd
0
pqdG+ L∗
ˆ c∗d
0
p∗xq
∗
xdG = L
ˆ cd
0
pqdG+ L/Me − L
ˆ cd
0
pxqxdG
Therefore to show the consumer’s problem is consistent, it is sufficient to
show expenditure on home goods is equal to expenditure on exported goods
(
´ cd
0
pqdG =
´ cd
0
pxqxdG), which indeed holds by the above equalities of prices
and quantities. To show the balance of trade is consistent, we use the consumer
budget constraint which gives
e = M∗e
ˆ c∗d
0
p∗xq
∗
xLdG/Me
ˆ cd
0
pxqxL
∗dG = M∗eL/MeL
∗ = 1
Similarly, the implied foreign terms of trade is e∗ = 1. Thus δ = δ∗ and
e = e∗ = 1 generate an allocation consistent with monopolistic competition and
price system consistent with consumer maximization and free trade.
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3.2 Efficiency in Large Markets 10
Proposition 1 implies that market distortions persist in integrated markets
as they are equivalent to larger domestic markets and resource allocation in
an integrated market is suboptimal, except under CES demand (see Dhingra
and Morrow [11]). When markups vary, marginal revenues do not correspond
to marginal utilities so market allocations are not aligned with efficient alloca-
tions. This is particularly important when considering trade as a policy option,
as it implies that opening to trade may take the economy further from the so-
cial optimum. For example, market expansion from trade may induce exit of
low productivity firms from the market when it is optimal to keep more low
productivity firms with the purpose of preserving variety.
3.2. Efficiency in Large Markets
We examine when integrating with large global markets enables a small
economy to overcome its market distortions. From a theoretical perspective,
we term a large market the limit of the economy as the mass of workers L ap-
proaches infinity, and in practice we might expect that sufficiently large markets
approximate this limiting case.11
Large markets enable us to understand whether competition can eliminate
distortions. For instance, when firms are symmetric, large markets eliminate
distortions as per capita fixed costs fall to zero. This is because free entry
leads to average cost pricing (p = c + f/qL), so the per capita fixed costs
summarize market power. As market size grows arbitrarily large and per capita
fixed costs fall to zero, markups disappear leading to perfect competition and
efficient allocations in large markets.
Building on this reasoning, we develop the large market concept in two di-
rections to understand the sources of inefficiency. First, we tie the conditions for
efficiency to demand primitives, taking into account endogeneity of allocations.
In the homogenous firm example above, this amounts to determining how f/qL
changes with market size under different model primitives. Second, we examine
whether productivity differences are compatible with large markets. When firms
are heterogeneous, simply knowing per capita fixed costs does not explain the
distribution of productivity, prices and quantity. At least three salient outcomes
can occur. One outcome is that competitive pressures might weed out all firms
but the most productive. This occurs for instance when marginal revenue is
bounded, as when u is quadratic or CARA (e.g. Behrens and Murata 4). It
may also happen that access to large markets allows even the least productive
firms to amortize fixed costs and produce. To retain the fundamental properties
of monopolistic competition under productivity differences, we chart out a third
possibility between these two extremes: some, but not all, firms produce. To
do so, we maintain the previous regularity conditions for a market equilibrium.
In order to aid the analysis, we make three assumptions on demand at small
11How large markets need to be to justify this approximation is an open quantitative ques-
tion.
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3.2 Efficiency in Large Markets 11
quantities. The first assumption enables a clear distinction between the three
salient outcomes in large markets.
Definition 2 (Interior Markups). The inverse demand elasticity and elastic-
ity of utility are bounded away from 0 and 1 for small quantities. Formally,
limq→0 µ(q) and limq→0 ε(q) ∈ (0, 1).
The assumption of interior markups guarantees that as the quantity sold
from a firm to a consumer becomes small (as happens for all positive unit cost
firms), markups remain positive (µ > 0) and prices remain bounded (µ < 1). It
also guarantees that the added utility provided per labor unit at the optimum
converges to a non-zero constant (e.g., Solow 35, Kuhn and Vives 22). An
example of a class of utility functions satisfying interior markups is the expo-
power utility where u(q) = [1 − exp (−αq1−ρ)]/α for ρ ∈ (0, 1). It nests CES
preferences for α = 0.
When markups are interior, there is a sharp taxonomy of what may hap-
pen to the distribution of costs, prices and total quantities (Lq(c)), as shown
in Proposition 8 in the Appendix. In words, Proposition 8 shows that when
markups are interior and the cost cutoff converges, one of three things must
happen. 1) Only the lowest cost firms remain and prices go to zero (akin to
perfect competition), while the lowest cost firms produce infinite total quanti-
ties. 2) Post-entry, all firms produce independent of cost while prices become
unbounded and the total quantities produced become negligible, akin to a “ren-
tier” case where firms produce little after fixed costs are incurred. 3) The cost
cutoff converges to a positive finite level, and a non-degenerate distribution of
prices and total quantities persists. Although each of these possibilities might
be of interest, we focus on the case when the limiting cost draw distribution
exhibits heterogeneity (limL→∞ cmktd > 0) but fixed costs still play a role in
determining which firms produce (limL→∞ cmktd < ∞). We therefore make the
following assumption, which by Proposition 8 will guarantee non-degenerate
prices and total quantities:
Definition 3 (Interior Convergence). In the large economy, the market and
optimal allocations have a non-degenerate cost distribution in which some but
not all entrants produce.
Under interior markups and convergence, the economy converges to a monop-
olistically competitive limit distinct from the extremes of a perfectly competitive
limit or a rentier limit. As the economy grows, each worker consumes a negligi-
ble quantity of each variety. At these low levels of quantity, the inverse demand
elasticity does not vanish and firms can still extract a positive markup µ. This
is in sharp contrast to a competitive limit, in which firms are left with no market
power and µ drops to zero. Similarly, the social markup (1 − ε) does not drop
to zero in the monopolistically competitive limit, so each variety contributes at
a positive rate to utility even at low levels of quantity. The monopolistically
competitive limit is therefore consistent with positive markups which become
more uniform with increased market size.
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In fact, this monopolistically competitive limit has a sharper characterization
very close to the conditions which characterize a finite size market under CES
demand (including efficiency). We therefore refer to it as a “CES limit” and
introduce one last regularity condition to obtain this result.
Definition 4 (Market Identification). Quantity ratios distinguish price ratios
for small q:
If κ 6= κ˜ then lim
q−→0
p(κq)/p(q) 6= lim
q−→0
p(κ˜q)/p(q).
Market identification guarantees production levels across firms can be dis-
tinguished if the firms charge distinct prices as quantities sold become negligi-
ble. Combining these three assumptions of interior markups, convergence and
identification ensures the large economy goes to the CES limit, summarized as
Proposition 5. The intuition for the role of these assumptions follows. As market
size grows large, q −→ 0 so under Interior Markups, (p− c) /p = µ (q) −→ µ (0)
and, finite but non-zero markups can persist in the large economy. Since prof-
its are µ (q) / (1− µ (q)) · Lcq, whether a particular firm survives in the large
economy depends on how variable costs Lcq evolve with market size. Clearly, if
variable costs diverge to zero for a firm with cost c, that firm must eventually
exit, while if variable costs diverge to infinity, the firm must eventually enter.
To arrive at the CES limit, necessarily variable costs must converge to a positive
level, which requires convergence of the total quantity sold, Lq. However, since
firms are embedded in a heterogeneous environment where aggregate conditions
impact firm behavior, the pointwise convergence of markups {µ (q (c))} is not
sufficient to guarantee that total quantities {Lq (c)} are well behaved in aggre-
gate. What is sufficient is that prices {p (c)} can distinguish firms as market
size grows large, thus the Market Identification condition.12
Proposition 5. Under the above definitions, as market size approaches infinity,
outcomes approach the CES limit. This limit has the following characteristics:
1. Prices, markups and expected profits converge to positive constants.
2. Per capita quantities q(c) go to zero, while aggregate quantities Lq(c)
converge.
3. Relative quantities Lq(c)/Lq(cd) converge to (c/cd)−1/α with α = limq−→0 µ(q).
4. The entrant per worker ratio Me/L converges.
5. The market and socially optimal allocations coincide.
Proposition 5 shows that integration with large markets can push economies
based on variable elasticity demand to the CES limit. In this limit, the in-
verse demand elasticity and the elasticity of utility become constant, ensuring
the market outcome is socially optimal. Firms charge constant markups which
exactly cross-subsidize entry of low productivity firms to preserve variety. This
12From a technical standpoint, this guarantees entry is well behaved, avoiding pathological
sequences of potential equilibria as market size grows large.
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wipes out the distortions of imperfect competition as the economy becomes
large. While dealing with the assumptions of the market equilibrium is some-
what delicate (see Appendix), we can explain Proposition 5 intuitively in terms
of our previous result that CES preferences induce efficiency. In large markets,
the quantity q(c) sold to any individual consumer goes to zero, so markups
µ(q(c)) converge to the same constant independent of c.13 This convergence to
constant markups aligns perfectly with those generated by CES preferences with
an exponent equal to 1− limq−→0 µ(q). Thus, large markets reduce distortions
until market allocations are perfectly aligned with socially optimal objectives.
The CES limit is optimal despite the presence of imperfect competition in
the limit, but it is an open empirical question whether markets are sufficiently
large for this to be a reasonable approximation to use in lieu of richer variable
elasticity demand. When integrated markets are small, variable markups are
crucial in understanding distortions and additional gains can be reaped by using
domestic policy in conjunction with trade policy.
4. Conclusion
This paper examines the efficiency of market allocations when firms vary
in productivity and markups. Considering the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz framework,
the efficiency of CES demand is valid even with productivity differences across
firms. This is because market outcomes maximize revenue, and under CES
demand, private and social incentives are perfectly aligned.
When firms differ in market power, the market outcomes of quantity, variety
and productivity are not socially optimal due to imperfect competition among
firms. We examine whether international integration can be a policy tool to
mitigate these distortions through increased competition. Market expansion
does not guarantee welfare gains under imperfect competition. But we find that
integrating with large markets holds out the possibility of approaching the CES
limit, which induces constant markups and therefore an efficient outcome.
Even though integration can cause market and social objectives to perfectly
align, “How Large is Large?” is an open question. Further work quantifying
these relationships could explain the scope for integration as a tool to improve
the performance of imperfectly competitive markets.
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Appendix A. Appendix: The Impact of Large Markets
To arrive at the large market result, we first state Lemmas characterizing
convergence in the large market and then show market allocations coincide with
optimal allocations. Detailed proofs of the Lemmas are in the Online Appendix.
Lemma 6. As market size becomes large:
1. Market revenue per capita is increasing in market size and goes to infinity.
2. At the optimum, utility per capita is increasing in market size and goes
to infinity.
3. Market entry goes to infinity.
Proof. From Dhingra and Morrow [11], the market allocation solves
max
Me,cd,q(c)
LMe
ˆ cd
0
u′ (q(c)) q(c)dG subject to L ≥Me
(ˆ cd
0
Lcq(c) + fdG+ Fe
)
.
Let R (L) ≡ Me
´ cd
0
u′ (q(c)) q(c)dG be the revenue per capita under the
market allocation. Fix L and let {q(c), cd,Me} denote the market allocation
with L resources. Consider an increased resource level L˜ > L with allocation
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{
q˜(c), c˜d, M˜e
}
≡
{(
L/L˜
)
· q(c), cd,
(
L˜/L
)
·Me
}
which direct inspection shows
is feasible. This allocation generates revenue per capita of
M˜e
ˆ c˜d
0
u′ (q˜(c)) q(c)dG = Me
ˆ cd
0
u′
((
L/L˜
)
· q(c)
)
q(c)dG ≤ R
(
L˜
)
.
Since u is concave, it follows that R
(
L˜
)
> R (L). Since q˜(c) =
(
L/L˜
)
·
q(c) −→ 0 for all c > 0 and limq−→0 u′ (q) = ∞, revenue per capita goes to
infinity as L˜ −→∞. A similar argument holds for the social optimum.
First note that q(c) is fixed by u′ (q(c)) [1− µ (q(c))] = δc, and δ −→∞ and
µ (q(c)) is bounded, it must be that u′ (q(c)) −→ ∞ for c > 0. This requires
q(c) −→ 0 for c > 0. Since revenue u′ (q(c)) q(c) is equal to ε (q(c))u (q(c)) and ε
is bounded, revenue also goes to zero for each c > 0. Revenue is also decreasing
in δ for every c, so we can bound revenue with a function B(c). In particular,
for any fixed market size L˜ and implied allocation
{
q˜(c), c˜d, M˜e
}
, for L ≥ L˜:
u′ (q(c)) q(c)1[0,cd](c) ≤ u′ (q˜(c)) q˜(c)1[0,c˜d](c) + u′ (q˜(c˜d)) q˜(c˜d)1[c˜d,∞](c) ≡ B(c)
(A.1)
where we appeal to the fact that q(c) is decreasing in c for any market size.
Since for any L,
´ cd
0
u′ (q(c)) q(c)dG = δ/Me, it is clear that
´∞
0
B(c)dG =´ c˜d
0
u′ (q˜(c)) q˜(c)dG + u′ (q˜(cd)) q˜(cd) < ∞. Since u′ (q(c)) q(c) converges point-
wise to zero for c > 0, we conclude
lim
L−→∞
ˆ cd
0
u′ (q(c)) q(c)dG =
ˆ cd
0
lim
L−→∞
u′ (q(c)) q(c)dG = 0
by dominated convergence. Therefore limL−→∞ δ/Me = 0 which with δ −→
∞ shows Me −→∞. The optimal allocation case is similar.
Lemma 7. For all market sizes and all positive marginal cost (c > 0) firms:
1. Profits (pi(c)) and social profits ($(c) ≡ (1− ε(c)) /ε(c) · cq(c)L− f) are
bounded.
2. Total quantities (Lq(c)) in the market and optimal allocation are bounded.
Proof. For any costs cL < cH , q(cH) is in the choice set of a firm with costs cL
and therefore
pi(cL) ≥ (p(cH)− cL) q(cH)L− f = pi(cH) + (cH − cL) q(cH)L. (A.2)
Furthermore, for every c˜ > 0, we argue pi(c˜) is bounded. For c ≡ c˜/2, pi(c˜) ≤
pi(c) while pi(c) is bounded since limL→∞
´ cd
0
pi(c)dG = Fe and lim supL→∞ pi(c) =
∞ would imply lim supL→∞
´ cd
0
pi(c)dG = ∞. It follows from Equation (A.2)
that Lq(c) is bounded. Substituting $ for pi leads to similar arguments for the
social optimum.
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Proposition 8. Assume markups are interior. Then under the market alloca-
tion:
1. limL→∞ cmktd =∞ iff limL→∞ p
(
cmktd
)
=∞ iff limL→∞ Lq
(
cmktd
)
= 0.
2. limL→∞ cmktd = 0 iff limL→∞ p
(
cmktd
)
= 0 iff limL→∞ Lq
(
cmktd
)
=∞
3. limL→∞ cmktd ∈ (0,∞) iff limL→∞ p
(
cmktd
) ∈ (0,∞) iff limL→∞ Lq (cmktd ) ∈
(0,∞) .
Similarly, under the optimal allocation:
1. limL→∞ c
opt
d =∞iff limL→∞ u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
)
=∞iff limL→∞ Lq
(
coptd
)
=
0.
2. limL→∞ c
opt
d = 0iff limL→∞ u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
)
= 0iff limL→∞ Lq
(
coptd
)
=
∞.
3. limL→∞ c
opt
d ∈ (0,∞) iff limL→∞ u◦q
(
coptd
)
/λq
(
coptd
) ∈ (0,∞) iff limL→∞ Lq (coptd ) ∈
(0,∞) .
Proof. Note the following zero profit relationships that hold at the cost cutoff
ca, suppressing the market superscripts throughout we have:
u′ (q (cd)) /δ − f/ [Lq (cd) · µ ◦ q (cd) / (1− µ ◦ q (cd))] = cd, (A.3)
Lcdq (cd) · µ ◦ q (cd) / (1− µ ◦ q (cd)) = f (A.4)
First, if limL→∞ Lq (cd) = 0, Equation (A.4) implies cd·µ◦q (cd) / (1− µ ◦ q (cd)) −→
∞. Clearly q (cd) −→ 0 and since limq→0 µ (q) ∈ (0, 1), µ◦q (cd) / (1− µ ◦ q (cd))
is bounded, and therefore cd −→ ∞. Now suppose cd −→ ∞ and since
cd ≤ u′ (q (cd)) /δ, u′ (q (cd)) /δ −→ ∞. Finally, if u′ (q (cd)) /δ −→ ∞, since
δ −→∞, necessarily q (cd) −→ 0 so we find µ◦q (cd) / (1− µ ◦ q (cd)) is bounded.
It follows from Equation (A.4) that Lcdq (cd) is bounded, so from Equation
(A.3), Lq (cd) · u′ (q (cd)) /δ is bounded so Lq (cd) −→ 0.
If limL→∞ Lq (cd) = ∞, q (cd) −→ 0 so from limq→0 µ (q) ∈ (0, 1), µ ◦
q (cd) / (1− µ ◦ q (cd)) is bounded. Therefore from Equation (A.4), cd −→ 0.
Now assume cd −→ 0 so from (A.4), Lq (cd) · µ ◦ q (cd) / (1− µ ◦ q (cd)) −→
∞ which implies with Equation (A.3) that u′ (q (cd)) /δ −→ 0. Finally, if
u′ (q (cd)) /δ −→ 0, (A.3) shows cd −→ 0.
The second set of equivalences follows from examining the conditions for a
firm at the limiting cost cutoff c∞d ∈ (0,∞). The argument for the optimal
allocation is similar.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
19
Lemma 9. Assume interior convergence. Then as market size grows large:
1. In the market, p(c) converges in (0,∞) for c > 0 and Lq(cd) converges
in (0,∞).
2. In the optimum, u ◦ q(c)/λq(c) and Lq(cd) converge in (0,∞) for c > 0.
Proof. Since q(c) −→ 0 for all c > 0, limq→0 µ(q) ∈ (0, 1) shows limL→∞ p(c)
aligns with constant markups and thus converges for all c > 0. In particu-
lar, p(cd) converges and L (p(cd)− cd) q(cd) = f so it follows Lq(cd) converges.
Similar arguments hold for the social optimum.
Lemma 10. Assume interior convergence and large market identification. Then
for the market and social optimum, Lq(c) converges for c > 0.
Proof. Fix any c > 0 and first note that for both the market and social planner,
q(c)/q(cd) = Lq(c)/Lq(cd) and both Lq(c) and Lq(cd) are bounded, so q(c)/q(cd)
is bounded.
Now consider the market. q(c)/q(cd) ≥ 1 has at least one limit point and
if it has two limit points, say a and b with a < b, there exist subsequences
(q(c)/q(cd))an → a and (q(c)/q(cd))bn → b. There also exist distinct κ and κ˜ in
(a, b) so that eventually
(q(c))an < κq(cd)an < κ˜q(cd)bn < (q(c))bn .
With u′′ < 0 this implies
(u′(q(c))/u′(q(cd)))an > (u
′(κq(cd))/u′(q(cd)))an
> (u′(κ˜q(cd))/u′(q(cd)))
> (u′(q(c))/u′(q(cd)))bn .
By assumption, limq→0 u′(κq)/u′(q) > limq→0 u′(κ˜q)/u′(q) but since q(c) −→ 0,
lim
n→∞ (u
′ ◦ q(c)/u′ ◦ q(cd))an = limn→∞ ([1− µ ◦ q(c)] c/ [1− µ ◦ q(cd)] cd)an = c/cd
= lim
n→∞ (u
′ ◦ q(c)/u′ ◦ q(cd))bn
where we have used the fact that limq→0 µ (q) ∈ (0, 1), however by assumption
this contradicts a < b.
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For the social optimum, this argument holds (substituting ε 6= 0 for u′′ < 0)
so long as
κ 6= κ˜ implies lim
q→0
(u(κq)/κq) / (u(q)/q) 6= lim
q→0
(u(κ˜q)/κq) / (u(q)/q) (A.5)
Since limq→0 u′(q) =∞ and limq→0 ε ∈ (0,∞) it follows that limq→0 u(q)/q =
∞. By L’Hospital’s rule, limq→0 (u(κq)/κq) / (u(q)/q) = limq→0 u′(κq)/u′(q) for
all κ so the condition (A.5) in holds because κ 6= κ˜ implies limq→0 u′(κq)/u′(q) 6=
limq→0 u′(κ˜q)/u′(q).
Lemma 11. At extreme quantities, social and private markups align as follows:
1.If limq→0 1− ε(q) < 1 then limq→0 1− ε(q) = limq→0 µ(q).
2.If limq→0 1− ε(q) < 1 then limq→0 1− ε(q) = limq→0 µ(q).
Proof. By assumption, limq→0 ε(q) > 0. Expanding this limit via L’Hospital’s
rule shows
lim
q→0
ε(q) = lim
q→0
q/ (u(q)/u′(q))
= lim
q→0
1/ lim
q→0
(
1− u(q)u′′(q)/(u′(q))2)
= 1/ lim
q→0
(1 + µ (q) /ε (q))
= lim
q→0
ε (q) / lim
q→0
(ε (q) + µ (q))
which gives the first part of the result. Identical steps for q −→ ∞ give the
second part.
Lemma 12. Assume interior convergence and large market identification. As
market size grows large:
1. q(c)/q(cd) −→ (c/cd)−1/αwith α = limq→0 µ (q) .
2. The cost cutoffs for the social optimum and market converge to the same
value.
3. The entrant per worker ratios Me/L converge to the same value.
Proof. Define Υ(c/cd) by (the above results show this limit is well defined)
Υ(c/cd) ≡ lim
q→0
u′(Υ(c/cd)q)/u′(q) = c/cd.
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We will show in fact that Υ(c/cd) = (c/cd)−α. It follows from the definition
that Υ is weakly decreasing, and the results above show Υ is one to one, so it
is strictly decreasing. Define fq(z) ≡ u′(zq)/u′(q) so limq→0 fq(z) = Υ−1(z) for
all Υ−1(z) ∈ (0, 1). Note
f ′q(z) = u
′′(zq)q/u′(q) = −µ(zq) · u′(zq)/zu′(q)
so since limq→0 µ(zq) = µ∞ ∈ (0, 1) and limq→0 u′(zq)/zu′(q) = Υ−1(z)/z,
we know that limq→0 f ′q(z) = −µ∞Υ−1(z)/z. On any strictly positive closed
interval I, µ and u′(zq)/zu′(q) are monotone in z so f ′q(z) converges uniformly
on I as q −→ 0. Rudin [33] (Thm 7.17) shows
lim
q−→0
f ′q(z) = d lim
q−→0
fq(z)/dz = −µ∞Υ−1(z)/z = dΥ−1(z)/dz. (A.6)
We conclude that Υ−1(z) is differentiable and thus continuous. Given the
form deduced in (A.6), Υ−1(z) is continuously differentiable. Since dΥ−1(z)/dz =
1/Υ′◦Υ−1(z), composing both sides with Υ(z) and using (A.6) we have Υ′(z) =
−Υ(z)/µ∞z. Therefore Υ is CES, in particular Υ(z) = z−1/µ∞ .
Finally, let copt∞ and cmkt∞ be the limiting cost cutoffs as L −→ ∞ for at the
social optimum and market, respectively. Letting qopt(c), qmkt(c) denote the
socially optimal and market quantities, we know from above that for all c > 0:
qopt (c) /qopt
(
coptd
) −→ (copt∞ /c)1/α , qmkt (c) /qmkt (cmktd ) −→ (cmkt∞ /c)1/α .
(A.7)
Now consider the conditions involving fe,
´ cmktd
0
pi(c)dG = fe =
´ copt
d
0
$(c)dG.
Expanding,
L
ˆ cmktd
0
µ ◦ qmkt(c)
1− µ ◦ qmkt(c)cq
mkt(c)dG− fG(cmktd ) =
L
ˆ copt
d
0
1− ε ◦ qopt(c)
ε ◦ qopt(c) cq
opt(c)dG− fG(coptd ).
It necessarily follows that
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lim
L−→∞
L
ˆ cmktd
0
µ ◦ qmkt(c)/ (1− µ ◦ qmkt(c)) · cqmkt(c)dG− fG(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
L
ˆ copt
d
0
(
1− ε ◦ qopt(c)) /ε ◦ qopt(c) · cqopt(c)dG− fG(coptd ). (A.8)
Using Equation (??), we see that Lqopt(c) and Lqmkt(c) converge uniformly
on any strictly positive closed interval. Combined with the fact that limq→0 µ(q) =
limq→0 1 − ε(q), we see from Equation (A.8) the limits of the µ/ (1− µ) and
(1− ε) /ε terms are equal and factor out of Equation (A.8), leaving
lim
L−→∞
Lcmkt∞ q
mkt(cmkt∞ )
ˆ cmktd
0
(c/cmkt∞ )(c/c
mkt
d )
−1/αdG− fG(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
Lcopt∞ q
opt(copt∞ )
ˆ copt
d
0
(c/copt∞ )(c/c
opt
d )
−1/αdG− fG(coptd ).
Noting f (1− µ∞) /µ∞ = Lcmkt∞ qmkt(cmkt∞ ) = Lcopt∞ qopt(copt∞ ), we therefore
have
lim
L−→∞
ˆ cmktd
0
(c/cmkt∞ )
1−1/α(cmkt∞ /c
mkt
d )
−1/αdG−G(cmktd ) =
lim
L−→∞
ˆ copt
d
0
(c/copt∞ )
1−1/α(copt∞ /c
opt
d )
−1/αdG−G(coptd )
so that finally evaluating the limits, we have
ˆ cmkt∞
0
[
(c/cmkt∞ )
1−1/α − 1
]
dG =
ˆ copt∞
0
[
(c/copt∞ )
1−1/α − 1
]
dG. (A.9)
Letting h(w) ≡ ´ w
0
[
(c/w)1−1/α − 1] dG, we see that h′(w) = ´ w
0
(1/α− 1) c1−1/αw1/α−2dG
and since α = µ∞ ∈ (0, 1), h′ > 0. Since h is strictly increasing, there is a unique
copt∞ , namely copt∞ = cmkt∞ such that Equation (A.9) holds. Checking the condi-
tions for L/Me show they coincide between the market and social optimum as
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
23
well.
